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Abstract Previous studies on directed forgetting in visual
working memory (VWM) have shown that, if people are
cued to remember only a subset of the items currently
held in VWM, they will completely forget the uncued,
no longer relevant items. While this finding is indicative
of selective remembering, it remains unclear whether di-
rected forgetting can also occur in the absence of any
concurrent to-be-remembered information. In the current
study, we addressed this matter by asking participants to
memorize a single object that could be followed by a cue
to forget or remember this object. Following the cue, we
assessed the object’s activation in VWM by determining
whether a matching distractor would capture attention in a
visual search task. The results showed that, compared to a
cue to remember, a cue to forget led to a reduced likelihood of
attentional capture by a matching distractor. In addition, we
found that capture effects by to-be-remembered and to-be-
forgotten distractors remained stable as the interval between
the onset of the cue and the search task increased from 700 ms
to 3900 ms. We conclude that, in the absence of any to-be-
remembered objects, an instruction to forget an object held in
WM leads to a rapid but incomplete deactivation of the repre-
sentation of that object, thus allowing it to continue to produce
a weak biasing effect on attentional selection for several sec-
onds after the instruction to forget.
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Workingmemory
BForge t t ing i s as impor tan t a func t ion as
remembering.^ (p. 148; James, 1892).
As alluded to by William James, there are benefits to for-
getting. In the domain of working memory (WM), the mind’s
system for temporary maintenance and manipulation of infor-
mation (Baddeley, 2010; Carlisle, Arita, Pardo, & Woodman,
2011; Cowan, 2008; Oberauer et al. 2012), forgetting is im-
portant because WM is known to be limited in its capacity for
retaining information (Cowan, 2010; Luck & Vogel, 1997)
and because it is known that information activated in WM
biases the selection of new perceptual input towards matching
stimuli (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Downing, 2000; Greene,
Kennedy, & Soto, 2015; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006;
Pan, 2010; Sasin, Nieuwenstein, & Johnson, 2015; Sasin &
Nieuwenstein, 2016; Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, & Blanco,
2005). Thus, the forgetting of no longer relevant information
is of importance to protect WM from being overloaded and to
prevent no longer relevant information from guiding atten-
tional selection and behavior (Ecker, Lewandowsky, &
Oberauer, 2014; Ecker, Oberauer, & Lewandowsky, 2014).
In previous studies, directed or intentional forgetting of
information in WM has been investigated using the retro-
cuing paradigm (Gunseli, Van Moorselaar, Meeter, &
Olivers, 2015; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; Pertzov,
Bays, Joseph, & Husain, 2013; Van Moorselaar, Battisoni,
Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2015; Van Moorselaar, Olivers,
Theeuwes, Lamme, & Sligte, 2015; Williams, Hong, Kang,
Carlisle, &Woodman, 2013;Williams&Woodman, 2012). In
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this paradigm, participants are first presented an array of items
that have to be encoded into WM and then they are presented
with a cue that indicates which subset of these items needs to
be prioritized and remembered for a later memory test.
Subsequently, on some trials, memory for the uncued items
is unexpectedly assessed, either by asking participants to re-
produce an uncued item or by examining whether a distractor
that matches one of the uncued items captures attention in a
visual search task, a phenomenon known as memory-driven
attentional capture (Downing, 2000; Greene, Kennedy, &
Soto, 2015; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; Pan, 2010;
Sasin, Nieuwenstein, & Johnson, 2015; Soto, Heinke,
Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005). Taken together, the results of
these studies show that retro-cues are effective in enhancing
memory for the cued items, and they make clear that this
enhancement goes at the expense of memory for the uncued
items, as many of these studies found that the uncued items are
completely forgotten. Specifically, studies employing the im-
plicit measure of memory-driven attentional capture show no
evidence of capture by distractors matching an uncued item
(Olivers et al., 2006; van Moorselaar, Battistoni, et al. 2015;
van Moorselaar, Olivers, et al. 2015), whereas studies using
explicit measures show that participants can only guess in
trying to reproduce the color of an uncued item (Williams
et al., 2013). In accounting for these effects, it has been pro-
posed that a retro-cue leads to attentional prioritization and
selective maintenance of the cued items. That is, in more gen-
eral terms, the cue is assumed to cause of shift or redistribution
of limited WM resources to only the cued items (see, also,
Bays&Husain, 2008), thus causing the uncued items to decay
in the absence of resources to support their retention in WM.
The current study
While studies using the retro-cuing paradigm provide compel-
ling evidence that people are capable of selectively remem-
bering a cued subset of items held in visual working memory
(VWM), they leave unresolved whether people are able to
intentionally forget no-longer relevant items held in VWM.
That is, the fact that people can selectively remember a cued
subset of items does not entail intentional forgetting of the
uncued items, as the forgetting of uncued items could be ex-
plained as an unintentional consequence of the attentional
prioritization of the cued items. In the current study, we set
out to provide a more direct test of intentional forgetting by
examining how a cue to forget an earlier memorized object
influences attentional capture by a matching distractor when
there is no competing information to be retained in VWM.
Specifically, we asked participants to memorize a single col-
ored shape which was followed by a cue that indicated wheth-
er this object had to be retained in VWM for a later recognition
test or whether it could be forgotten. To ensure that
participants would adhere to the instruction provided by the
retro-cue, the cue was 100% valid (Gunseli et al., 2015,
Williams & Woodman, 2012), meaning that we never unex-
pectedly probed participants for their memory of the uncued
item in a surprise recognition test. To determine whether a cue
to forget would indeed lead to intentional forgetting, we used
an implicit measure of VWM activation by examining wheth-
er a distractor that matched the to-be-remembered or to-be-
forgotten object would capture attention in an unrelated visual
search task that was performed at different intervals following
the cue. By varying the duration of the interval separating the
cue and the visual search task, we aimed to assess the time
course of any cue-induced forgetting.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants Eighteen students of the University of
Groningen (11 females;M = 20.3 years; SD = 1.45) participat-
ed in the experiment for partial course credit. All participants
had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. The study
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology
Department. Informed written consent was obtained.
Apparatus and stimuli Stimulus presentation and response
collection were controlled by a program written with E-prime
2.0 (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002) and the ex-
periment was conducted on computers that were fitted with
22-inch (c.56-cm) CRT computer monitors with a refresh rate
of 100 Hz and a resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels.All stimuli
were presented on a gray background. The shapes used were a
circle (1.8° × 1.8° of visual angle), a diamond (1.8° × 1.8°), a
square (1.9° × 1.9°), a triangle (2° × 1.7°), and a hexagon
(2° × 1.7°). The color of the shapes could be red (R = 255,
G = 0, B = 0), green (R = 0, G = 255, B = 0), blue (R = 0,
G = 0, B = 255), yellow (R = 255, G = 255, B = 0) or pink
(R = 255, G = 192, B = 203). The thickness of the border line
of the shapes was 0.12° in visual angle. One colored shape
was displayed as a memory object at the center of the screen.
Four colored shapes were displayed for the search task and
each shape contained a black line (0.57° length × 0.12°). The
three distractor lines were vertical and the target line was tilted
38° either to the left or to the right. The shapes were positioned
at the corner of an imaginary rectangle measuring 5.7° of
visual angle horizontally and 4.1° vertically. Each object in
the search display was unique in color and shape. The cue to
forget or remember was displayed in the form of the corre-
sponding word being shown in black Courier New, 20-point
font, at the center of the screen.
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Procedure Figure 1 illustrates different types of trials used in
Experiment 1. At the beginning of each trial, there was 500-ms
fixationperiod, afterwhich thememoryobjectwas presented for
a durationof1000ms.Participantswere asked to remember both
the color and the shape of the memory object. Next, there was a
500-ms blank interval followed by the cue which indicated
whether the memory object had to be maintained in memory
for a later memory test or whether it could be forgotten. The cue
wasdisplayedfor500ms.Afteraninter-stimulus-interval (ISI)of
200, 600, 1000 or 1400 ms, the search display appeared. The
participant’s task for the search display was to discriminate the
orientation of the target line by pressing the BZ^ keywhen it was
tilted to the left andbypressing the BM^ keywhen itwas tilted to
theright.Thereweretwodifferent typesof trials.On invalid trials,
oneof theobjects in thesearchdisplaymatchedboth thecolorand
the shape of the memory object. This matching object always
contained a distractor line and always was presented on the op-
posite side to the target.Onneutral trials,neitherof the featuresof
thememory objectwas shared by any of the objects in the search
display. The search display remained on the screen until the re-
sponse was made. The response was followed by 500-ms blank
interval. In the remember condition, the memory test followed
the offset of this blank interval. For this test, a colored shape
appeared in the center of the screen and participants were
instructed to indicate whether this memory probe was identical
(in shape and color) to thememory object. On different trials, the
memory probe and thememory object differed in color, shape or
both features and the participants had to respond by pressing the
BM^keyof thekeyboard.When thememoryprobewas the same
as the memorized object, participants had to press the BZ^ key.
Participantswere instructed to execute thememory task as accu-
rately as possible, without time pressure. The search task had to
be completed as quickly and accurately as possible.
The manipulations of cue (remember or forget), distractor
match (invalid or neutral) and ISI (200, 600, 1000 or 1400
ms) resulted in a total of 16 conditions which were presented
in a random order. There were 32 trials for each condition,
resulting in a total of 512 trials which were presented in blocks
of 64 trials each. The experiment was preceded by 32 trials to
practice the tasks and the experiment took about 55 min in
total.
Results
Performance was near ceiling in the search and memory
tasks (M = 98% and M = 94% correct, respectively).
Before analyzing the RTs for the search task, we first
excluded those trials from the remember condition in
which the response to the memory task was incorrect. In
addition, we excluded all trials in which the response to
the search task was incorrect, and we also excluded trials
in which the search-RT appeared to be an outlier.
Specifically, we first excluded trials with search-RTs
shorter than 150 ms or longer than 3000 ms, and we
subsequently identified and excluded any remaining out-
liers using the procedure described by Van Selst and
Jolicoeur (1994). Together, these procedures resulted in
a loss of 2.4% of data points. The exclusion of trials did
not change the pattern of results.
To examine performance on the search task, we con-
ducted a 2 (cue: remember or forget) × 2 (match: invalid
or neutral) × 4 (ISI: 200, 600, 1000 or 1400 ms) repeated
measures ANOVA on the mean RTs for correct responses.
The results, illustrated in Fig. 2, revealed a main effect of
cue, F(1,17) = 22.33, p < .001, ηp
2=.57, match, F(1,17) =
27.01, p < .001, ηp
2=.61, and ISI, F(3,51) = 7.24, p = .003,
ηp
2=.30. In addition, there were significant interactions of
cue and ISI, F(3,51) = 2.91, p = .049, ηp
2=.15, and of cue
Fig. 1 Illustration of the task used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
Presentation of memory object was followed by the word cue (forget or
remember). After variable ISI (200 ms, 600 ms, 1000 ms or 1400 ms in
Experiment 1 and 200 ms, 600 ms, 2000 ms or 3400 ms in Experiment 2,
participants performed the search task. Thememory taskwas present only
on trials with the cue remember
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and match, F(1,17) = 10.87, p = .004, ηp
2=.39. The two-
way interaction between match and with ISI was non-sig-
nificant, F(3,51) = 1.09, p = .355, ηp
2=.06, and the three-
way interaction between match, cue and ISI was also not
significant, F(3,51) = 1.16, p = .325, ηp
2=.06.
In a subsequent series of analyses, we further examined
the two-way interactions between cue and ISI, and be-
tween cue and match. In examining the interaction be-
tween cue and ISI (see Fig. 3), we first tested the effect
of ISI for each cue condition separately. These analyses
showed that there was a significant effect of ISI in the
remember condition F(3,51) = 7.24, p = .001, ηp
2=.30, but
not in the forget condition, F(3,51) = 1.30, p = .284,
ηp
2=.07. For the remember condition, a series of post hoc
comparisons using the Holm–Bonferroni correction re-
vealed that RTs were significantly slower at the ISI of
200 ms than at all longer ISIs (all t’s > 2.11, all p’s
< .047), with no significant differences in RT for ISIs of
600 ms and longer (all t’s < 1.89, all p’s > .485). A similar
follow-up analysis for the interaction between cue and
match showed that invalid trials resulted in slower RTs
relative to neutral trials for both the remember condition,
M = 826 versus M = 774 ms, respectively, t(17) = 6.01,
p < .001, and the forget condition, 758 ms versus
741 ms, respectively, t(17) = 2.94, p = .009, with the mag-
nitude of the capture effect being significantly larger in
the former (52 ms) than in the latter condition (16 ms),
t(17) = 4.10, p = .001.
Experiment 2
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 show that a
distractor matching an earlier memorized object captured
attention regardless of whether it had to be remembered or
forgotten, but the capture effect was smaller when the
object had to be forgotten. Furthermore, the results of
Experiment 1 showed that the likelihood of attentional
capture by a distractor matching the to-be-forgotten object
remained constant across ISIs of 200– 1400 ms, thus sug-
gesting that there was no decay of the to-be-forgotten
object across this time period. To test if any such decay
would occur with longer intervals, Experiment 2 replicat-
ed Experiment 1 with the exception that the ISI between
the cue and search task was 200, 600, 2000 or 3400 ms.
Method
Participants Eighteen of the University of Groningen (12
females; M = 20.6 years; SD = 2.19) participated in the
experiment for partial course credit. None of the partici-
pants had taken part in Experiment 1 and all participants
had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. The
study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Fig. 2 Results of Experiment 1. Mean RTs (ms) in the search task as a
function of cue condition, match condition and the ISI (A). Mean RTs
(ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition and ISI (B). Mean
RTs (ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition and match
condition (C). Error bars within-subject standard errors of the mean
(Morey, 2008)
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Psychology Department. Informed written consent was
obtained.
Apparatus and stimuli The stimuli and apparatus were iden-
tical to those used in Experiment 1.
Procedure The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 ex-
cept that the ISI between the word cue and the search task was
200, 600, 2000 or 3400 ms.
Results
Participants achieved 92% correct on the memory task and
97% correct on the search task. In analyzing the results from
the search task, we followed the same procedures as those
described for Experiment 1, resulting in a loss of 2.5% of
the data points. The exclusion of trials did not change the
pattern of results.
Performance on the search task was analyzed in the same
way as in Experiment 1. The results, illustrated in Figure 3
showed significant main effects of cue, F(1,17) = 27.60,
p < .001, ηp
2=.62, match, F(1,17) = 26.94, p < .001, μp
2=.61,
and ISI, F(3,51) = 6.83, p = .002, ηp
2=.29. In addition, the re-
sults revealed significant interactions between cue and ISI,
F(3,51) = 7.72, p = .002, ηp
2=.31, and between cue and match,
F(1,17) = 11.90, p = .004, ηp
2 =.41. There was no interaction
between match and ISI, F(3,51) = 2.67, p = .071, ηp
2=.14, nor
betweenmatch, cue, and ISI,F(3,51) = 2.57, p = .084, ηp
2 = 13.
In a follow-up analysis, we further examined the Cue × ISI
interaction by testing the effect of ISI for the remember and
forget conditions separately. The effect of ISI was significant
in the remember condition, F(3,51) = 13.71, p < .001, ηp
2 =.45,
but not in the forget condition, F(3,51) = 0.87, p = .464,
ηp
2 =.05. For the remember condition, post hoc comparisons
with the Holm–Bonferroni correction revealed that RTs were
significantly slower at the ISI of 200 ms than at all longer ISIs,
all t’s > 2.11, all p’s < .047, with no significant differences in
RTacross ISIs of 600-3400 ms, all t’s < 0.95, all p’s > .542. To
further examine the Cue ×Match interaction (see Fig. 2), we
conducted paired-samples t tests. For the remember condition,
RTs were slower in the invalid (761 ms) than in the neutral
(711 ms) condition, t(17) = 5.98, p < .001, and the same was
true for the forget condition (707 ms vs. 688 ms, respectively;
t(17) = 2.36, p = .030). The difference in RT on invalid and
neutral trials was significantly smaller in the forget condition
(19 ms) than in the remember condition (50 ms), t(17) = 3.35,
p = .004.
General discussion
Previous studies on directed forgetting in VWM have shown
that, if participants are cued to remember a subset of items
currently held in VWM, their memory for the cued subset will
be enhanced at the expense of forgetting the uncued items
(Olivers et al., 2006; Van Moorselaar et al., 2015a; Van
Moorselaar et al., 2015b; Williams et al., 2013; Williams &
Woodman, 2012). While this finding makes clear that people
Fig. 3 Results of Experiment 2. Mean RTs (ms) in the search task as a
function of cue condition, match condition and the ISI (A). Mean RTs
(ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition and ISI (B). Mean
RTs (ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition and match
condition (C). Error bars within-subject standard errors of the mean
(Morey, 2008)
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can selectively remember a cued subset of information held in
VWM, it leaves unresolved whether people can also intention-
ally forget no longer relevant information in the absence of
any concurrent to-be-remembered information. To address
this matter, we asked participants to memorize a single object
which was followed by a cue to either remember or forget this
object, and we examined the effects of this instruction to re-
member or forget by determining the likelihood that a
distractor matching the earlier memorized object would cap-
ture attention in a visual search task that was presented at
different intervals following the cue. The results of two such
experiments converged in showing that an instruction to forget
leads to deactivation of the memory trace of the earlier mem-
orized object, such that attentional capture was still present but
less pronounced following an instruction to forget, as opposed
to remember, the earlier memorized object. Furthermore, the
results showed that capture was unaffected by the duration of
the interval between the cue and the search task, and they
showed that an instruction to remember led to slower visual
search when the search task followed closely in time to the
instruction to remember whereas no such slowing of search
was observed following a cue to forget.
In demonstrating that, in the absence of any to-be-
remembered items, a cue to forget an earlier memorized object
leads to a reduced likelihood of memory-driven attentional
capture, the current findings move beyond the results of pre-
vious studies which showed evidence of complete forgetting
of to-be-forgotten objects in the presence of to-be-
remembered objects (Olivers et al., 2006; Van Moorselaar
et al., 2015a; Van Moorselaar et al., 2015b; Williams et al.,
2013; Williams & Woodman, 2012). Specifically, while the
forgetting of uncued materials in previous studies can be ex-
plained as a side effect of the attentional prioritization and
selective maintenance of to-be-remembered items, the current
finding that an instruction to forget an earlier memorized ob-
ject led to a reduced likelihood of attentional capture by a
matching distractor can only be explained in terms of inten-
tional forgetting.
In accounting for why intentional forgetting did not fully
prevent the occurrence of memory-driven attentional capture,
we can conceive of three possible explanations: Participants
might have occasionally failed to adhere to the instruction to
forget, the to-be-forgotten object might have guided attention
based on a long-term memory (LTM) representation, or for-
getting might have led to an incomplete deactivation of the
WM trace, thus allowing for a weak, residual guidance effect.
In considering these three possibilities in closer detail, it be-
comes clear that incomplete deactivation appears to provide
the least contentious explanation. Specifically, the notion that
participants sometimes failed to adhere to the cue to forget
seems incompatible with a post-hoc analysis of the variance
of RTs in the forget condition. In this analysis, we compared
the standard deviations of RTs in the invalid and neutral trials
of the forget condition, the idea being that variance should be
larger on invalid trials than neutral trials if the invalid trials
indeed included some trials in which capture occurred because
of unsuccessful forgetting. The results of this comparison,
however, revealed no difference in the standard deviations of
RTs,1 thus providing no evidence for the possibility that the
residual attentional capture effect seen in the forget condition
stemmed from an occasional failure to forget the earlier mem-
orized object. With regard to the possibility that this residual
capture effect was driven by a long-term memory representa-
tion, we note that while the repeated exposure and memoriza-
tion of stimuli might indeed have led to an LTM representation
which could potentially guide visual attention (Rosen, Stern,
Michalka, Devaney, & Somers, 2015; Woodman, Carlisle, &
Reinhart, 2013), this seems an unlikely account of the residual
capture effect because any such LTM-guidance would be ex-
pected to occur for all distractors in the search task, thus pre-
cluding an LTM-driven capture effect as an explanation for the
capture effect found only in invalid trials in the forget condi-
tion. By implication, it seems that the residual capture effect
found in the forget condition is best explained in terms of an
intentional but incomplete deactivation of the representation
of the to-be-forgotten object. In this regard, the current find-
ings can be said to corroborate the results of studies of inten-
tional forgetting of verbal information, which have also pro-
vided evidence that people can choose to forget verbal infor-
mation from WM by demonstrating that increasing the num-
ber of forget cues leads to more complete forgetting
(Anderson & Green 2001; see also, Lee, Lee, & Tsai, 2007).
Indeed, in light of these earlier findings, it can be argued that
the current finding that memory-driven attentional capture still
occurred several seconds after a cue to forget may be due to
the fact that our use of a single cue to forget was insufficient to
cause complete forgetting of the earlier memorized object.
In considering the mechanism underlying the current find-
ing of directed forgetting, it is of relevance to note that, while
the capture effect by distractors matching the to-be-forgotten
object remained stable as the interval between the cue and the
search task increased from 200 to 3400 ms, we also did not
find evidence for a cost of processing the cue to forget, such
that reaction times on the search task were found to be stable
as the interval between the cue and the search task increased
from 200 to 3400 ms. In other words, the current findings
show that the processing of the cue to forget did not incur a
cost to performance on the search task, and they show that the
residual activation of the to-be-forgotten object did not dissi-
pate across increasing delays. In considering the implications
of these findings, it is important to bear in mind that the cue
itself was presented for 500 ms, meaning that the shortest
1 Specifically, we found that the average SD of RTs was equal for neutral and
invalid trials in the forget condition, M = 173 vs. M = 183, t(35) = 1.80,
p = .081.
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interval between the onset of the cue and the onset of the
search task was 700 ms. Thus, it appears to be the case that
the partial forgetting that was triggered by the cue took effect
during this 700-ms interval, such that no further forgetting
occurred across longer intervals. In this regard, the current
findings can be said to argue against decay-based theories of
forgetting (e.g., Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004),
whereas they offer support for interference-based theories of
forgetting (e.g., Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, &
Greaves, 2012), as the former would predict that forgetting
should increase with additional time, whereas the latter
would not predict such an effect if that period of time is
not used for processing other information, as was the case
in the current study.
In the current study, we found that an instruction to forget
the earlier encoded object led to overall faster performance in
a subsequent, unrelated search task that was performed at
different intervals after the presentation of the cue to forget
the object. This finding differs from the finding reported by
Fawcett and Taylor (Fawcett & Taylor, 2008; 2010), who
found that an instruction to forget an earlier encoded word
resulted in slower responses for a subsequent unrelated task
when the interval separating the cue and this unrelated task
was less than 1800 ms. In accounting for the discrepancy
between the current finding and this finding by Fawcett and
Taylor, it is important to note that there are a number of meth-
odological differences that might explain this discrepancy.
Specifically, the study by Fawcett and Taylor presented par-
ticipants with a study word on each trial, followed by an in-
struction to remember or forget. Subsequently, participants
performed unrelated detection tasks. After all the study words
were presented, participants performed a recognition test ex-
amining memory for the to-be-remembered words and, unex-
pectedly, for the to-be-forgotten words as well. In contrast, we
asked participants to memorize a simple colored shape on
each trial, which was followed by an instruction to remember
or forget which in turn was followed by the unrelated search
task. After the search task, a memory test was presented only
on trials in which participants were cued to remember the
object. In considering which of these methodological differ-
ences might explain the discrepancy in results, one could ar-
gue that perhaps the use of verbal materials and the require-
ment to forget in the presence of to-be-remembered words
might have led to different results in the study by Fawcett
and Taylor. Specifically, it could be that participants in the
study by Fawcett and Taylor required more time to process
the instruction to forget due to the difficulty of forgetting a
word, as opposed to forgetting one of a small set of possible
colored shapes, and due to the extra time and effort it might
take to forget in the presence of to-be-remembered items.
Indeed, it is worth noting that Ecker and colleagues (Ecker,
Lewandowsky, et al. 2014; Ecker, Oberauer, et al. 2014) found
that it takes less time to remove three items from WM than it
takes to remove only one or two of these items, thus lending
credence to the possibility that the discrepancy between the
current study and the findings by Fawcett and Taylor could be
due to the additional time it takes to forget in the presence of
to-be-remembered items.
To conclude, the current study shows that memory-driven
capture offers a highly useful paradigm to study intentional
forgetting of information held in VWM. Supplementing pre-
vious findings, the current findings show that participants can
choose to forget a single object held in VWM even when there
are no concurrent processing demands. In addition, they show
that such forgetting need not result in a complete deactivation
of the object’s representation inWM, and they suggest that the
process by which forgetting occurs can be accomplished rap-
idly, within 700 ms after the appearance of an instruction to
forget an earlier memorized object.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons At t r ibut ion 4 .0 In te rna t ional License (h t tp : / /
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Anderson, M. C., & Green, C. (2001). Suppressing unwanted memories
by executive control. Nature, 410(6826), 366–369.
Baddeley, A. (2010) Working memory. Current Biology, 20(4), 136–140.
Barrouillet, P., Bernardin, S., & Camos, V. (2004). Time constraints and
resource sharing in Adults’ working memory spans. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 133(1), 83–100.
Bays, P. M., Husain, M., & 5890. (2008). Dynamic shifts of limited
working memory resources in human vision. Science (New York,
N.Y.), 321, 851–4.
Carlisle, N. B., Arita, J. T., Pardo, D., & Woodman, G. F. (2011).
Attentional templates in visual working memory. Journal of
Neuroscience, 31(25), 9315–9322.
Cowan, N. (2008). What are the differences between long-term, short-
term, and working memory? Progress in Brain Research, 169, 323–
38.
Cowan, N. (2010). The magical mystery four: How is working memory
capacity limited, and Why? Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 19(1), 51–57.
Desimone, R., & Duncan, J. (1995). Neural mechanisms of selective
visual attention. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 18(1), 193–222.
Downing, P. E. (2000). Interactions between visual working memory and
selective attention. Psychological Science : A Journal of the
American Psychological Society/APS, 11(6), 467–73.
Ecker, U. K. H., Lewandowsky, S., & Oberauer, K. (2014). Removal of
information from working memory: A specific updating process.
Journal of Memory and Language, 74, 77–90.
Ecker, U. K. H., Oberauer, K., & Lewandowsky, S. (2014). Working
memory updating involves item-specific removal. Journal of
Memory and Language, 74, 1–15.
Fawcett, J. M., & Taylor, T. L. (2008). Forgetting is effortful: Evidence
from reaction time probes in an item-method directed forgetting
task. Memory & Cognition, 36(6), 1168–81.
Psychon Bull Rev
Fawcett, J. M., & Taylor, T. L. (2010). Directed forgetting shares mech-
anisms with attentional withdrawal but not with stop-signal inhibi-
tion. Memory & Cognition, 38(6), 797–808.
Greene, C. M., Kennedy, K., & Soto, D. (2015). Dynamic states in work-
ing memory modulate guidance of visual attention: Evidence from
an n-back paradigm. Visual Cognition, 23(5), 546–560.
Gunseli, E., van Moorselaar, D., Meeter, M., & Olivers, C. N. L. (2015).
The reliability of retro-cues determines the fate of noncued visual
working memory representations. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
22(5), 1334–1341.
Lee, Y., Lee, H., & Tsai, S. (2007). Effects of post-cue interval on inten-
tional forgetting. British Journal of Psychology (London, England :
1953), 98(Pt 2), 257–72.
Luck, S. J., & Vogel, E. K. (1997). The capacity of visual working mem-
ory for features and conjunctions. Nature, 390(6657), 279–81.
Morey, R. D. (2008). Confidence intervals from normalized data: A cor-
rection to cousineau (2005). Tutorial in Quantitative Methods for
Psychology, 4(2), 61–64.
Oberauer, K., Lewandowsky, S., Farrell, S., Jarrold, C., & Greaves, M.
(2012). Modeling working memory: An interference model of com-
plex span. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(5), 779–819.
Olivers, C. N. L., Meijer, F., & Theeuwes, J. (2006). Feature-based mem-
ory-driven attentional capture: Visual working memory content af-
fects visual attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 32(5), 1243–1265.
Pan, Y. (2010). Attentional capture by working memory contents.
Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology=Revue
Canadienne de Psychologie Expérimentale, 64(2), 124–8.
Pertzov, Y., Bays, P. M., Joseph, S., & Husain, M. (2013). Rapid forget-
ting prevented by retrospective attention cues. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
39(5), 1224–1231.
Rosen,M. L., Stern, C. E.,Michalka, S.W., Devaney, K. J., & Somers, D.
C. (2015). Influences of long-term memory-guided attention and
stimulus-guided attention on visuospatial representations within hu-
man intraparietal sulcus. Journal of Neuroscience, 35(32), 11358–
11363.
Sasin, E., & Nieuwenstein, M. (2016). Memory-driven attentional cap-
ture reveals the waxing and waning of working memory activation
due to dual-task interference. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1-7.
Sasin, E., Nieuwenstein, M., & Johnson, A. (2015). The role of depth of
encoding in attentional capture. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
22(5), 1424–9.
Schneider, W., Eschmann, A., & Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-Prime user’s
guide. Pittsburgh, PA: Psychology Software Tools, Inc.
Soto, D., Heinke, D., Humphreys, G. W., & Blanco, M. J. (2005). Early
involuntary Top-down guidance of attention fromworking memory.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 31(2), 248–261.
van Moorselaar, D., Battistoni, E., Theeuwes, J., & Olivers, C. N. L.
(2015). Rapid influences of cued visual memories on attentional
guidance. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1339(1),
1–10.
van Moorselaar, D., Olivers, C. N. L., Theeuwes, J., Lamme, V. A.
F., & Sligte, I. G. (2015). Forgotten but not gone: Retro-cue
costs and benefits in a double-cueing paradigm suggest multi-
p le s ta tes in visual shor t - te rm memory. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
41(6), 1755–1763.
Williams, M., Hong, S.W., Kang, M.-S., Carlisle, N. B., &Woodman, G.
F. (2013). The benefit of forgetting. Psychonomic Bulletin& Review,
20(2), 348–55.
Williams,M., &Woodman, G. F. (2012). Directed forgetting and directed
remembering in visual working memory. Journal of Experimental
Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38(5), 1206–20.
Woodman, G. F., Carlisle, N. B., & Reinhart, R. M. G. (2013). Where do
we store the memory representations that guide attention? Journal of
Vision, 13(3), 1.
Psychon Bull Rev
